Meh.. I'm thinking something akin to the failed hostage rescue during the Carter admin..
This is the Democratic Party.
- Thread starter lawpoke87
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That was a third option solution gone horribly wrong in part because we cut training and maintenance to save money during a period of high inflation. See generally my post a year or two ago that inflation kills people. Whether they are soldiers or widows who can no longer afford their bills and cut back on food.
We certainly don’t seem to be cutting spending this time around. In fact, we appear to be doing the opposite. In part due to the effect of the $2T in borrowed money we’re pouring into the economy. There’s an election upcoming after all.
It wasn't all training. Some of the failures were simple logistics of operating in desert terrain. Things we learned many times over in the following 3 decades.
Considering the largest marine base in the country is located in a desert, I dont consider inexperience with desert terrain a reasonable explanation or excuse
This is how you know you have been captured by propaganda. You make a statement based on belief and common sense knocks you in the head.
The failure in the desert resulted in a decade long review and it’s still debated. Most of it is available on the internet. So are countless interviews on YouTube. By the people really there. None of whom say it was caused by logistics.
Most commentators blame the actual fatal accident on a lack of adequate training of helicopter pilots and combat controllers in the post Vietnam era. The armed forces said, and most experts agree, that lack of training was a result of catastrophic cuts to the defense budget by a post Vietnam post Watergate Democratic Congress.
The follow up resulted in the creation of the 160th special operations aviation regiment. The no disputes best helicopter pilots and controllers in the world who almost exclusively insert and exfil special operations personnel. Go watch black hawk down if you want to see them. They were in Mogadishu and some of the survivors flew in the film.
What events contributed to the crash?
The team was placed into the sequence of events leading up to the crash by several helicopters breaking down due to poor maintenance and inspection prior to insertion. Indeed, most experts agree the wrong helicopters were used. The damaged and malfunctioning helicopters was certainly the reason for the mission scrub and once scrubbed, poorly trained controllers and poor weather led to the crash as the helicopters began to take off.
The decision to scrub that caused the accident was arrived at after a break down in command structure and eventually contacting the White House to break the stalemate. So we invented SOCOMM to minimize those issues going forward.
This incident had serious implications outside the military. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned in protest before the mission took off. All covert operatives in Iran left the country and it is believed some were killed in the process. The hostages were split up with some moving to sub standard conditions. There were other collateral consequences. Our allies were livid. Most Americans felt a deep sense of frustration and disappointment. It contributed heavily to Carter losing re-election.
Logistics was not a cause of the crash, unless you really want to stretch and say a stupidly over complex plan caused multiple logistics pressures. Like divided teams and multiple rendezvous points.
I’m sure flying through a sandstorm had nothing to do with the helicopter’s malfunctions or the crash which moments prior saw the chopper swirling dust into the controller’s face.
Well, I’m glad you believe Iranian propaganda. And you admit my point.
The Army allocated 8 helicopters for the mission to account for attrition. 6 were needed to proceed with the mission. 3 were lost to equipment failure unrelated to the desert storm - though the loss of one helicopter was due to electrical problems encountered in the storm but not caused by sand damage. Reducing the helicopter tally to 5. The official after action report and subsequent oversight reports pointed to a failure to provide a sufficient number of helicopters to account for known risks such as mechanical failure and weather. Even if the storm caused the 3 copters to be taken out, it was a failure to not account for that contingency.
With a critical shortage of helicopters they made the decision to abort. They waited 90 minutes burning fuel to get the White House OK to abort because of command control mission planning failures.
In an attempt to refuel one of the helicopters, the ground controller created an unsafe situation due to poor training. The pilot reacted and deaths resulted. The amount of sand on the ground that had fallen in the proceeding weeks was unplanned but not unusual. It was a typical problem for desert conditions. It required a hover taxi for lift off something all the other helicopters could do and did on exfil. The controller was not properly trained and had a negative reaction in combat conditions.
The mission was a failure before the accident. Before the storm. The mission failed because the plan required the upper limits of military capability at the time, including poorly maintained and inspected aircraft and a reluctance to commit sufficient forces to ensure mission success who had the training necessary to achieve every objective.
You don’t create entire specialized military units costing millions of dollars and completely overhaul the chain of command because of a sandstorm. Or a single controller lacking the training to understand that if he moves, for what ever reason, not matter how unpleasant the sand feels, if the pilot knows the controller is supposed to be stationary and lacks other reference points, if the controller moves then that will be interpreted as the aircraft moving not the controller. The controller didn’t know that at the time and that is what caused the pilot to react and caused the collision.
But hey, don’t believe me, believe the man responsible:
“I wish I had sent one more helicopter to get the hostages, and we would have rescued them and I would have been reelected.” - James Earl Carter in a 2015 interview.
The Army allocated 8 helicopters for the mission to account for attrition. 6 were needed to proceed with the mission. 3 were lost to equipment failure unrelated to the desert storm - though the loss of one helicopter was due to electrical problems encountered in the storm but not caused by sand damage. Reducing the helicopter tally to 5. The official after action report and subsequent oversight reports pointed to a failure to provide a sufficient number of helicopters to account for known risks such as mechanical failure and weather. Even if the storm caused the 3 copters to be taken out, it was a failure to not account for that contingency.
With a critical shortage of helicopters they made the decision to abort. They waited 90 minutes burning fuel to get the White House OK to abort because of command control mission planning failures.
In an attempt to refuel one of the helicopters, the ground controller created an unsafe situation due to poor training. The pilot reacted and deaths resulted. The amount of sand on the ground that had fallen in the proceeding weeks was unplanned but not unusual. It was a typical problem for desert conditions. It required a hover taxi for lift off something all the other helicopters could do and did on exfil. The controller was not properly trained and had a negative reaction in combat conditions.
The mission was a failure before the accident. Before the storm. The mission failed because the plan required the upper limits of military capability at the time, including poorly maintained and inspected aircraft and a reluctance to commit sufficient forces to ensure mission success who had the training necessary to achieve every objective.
You don’t create entire specialized military units costing millions of dollars and completely overhaul the chain of command because of a sandstorm. Or a single controller lacking the training to understand that if he moves, for what ever reason, not matter how unpleasant the sand feels, if the pilot knows the controller is supposed to be stationary and lacks other reference points, if the controller moves then that will be interpreted as the aircraft moving not the controller. The controller didn’t know that at the time and that is what caused the pilot to react and caused the collision.
But hey, don’t believe me, believe the man responsible:
“I wish I had sent one more helicopter to get the hostages, and we would have rescued them and I would have been reelected.” - James Earl Carter in a 2015 interview.
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Da fuq are you talking about with Iranian propaganda?
I’m not arguing that the sandstorm was purely responsible, I’m saying that our plan was foiled, in part due to our inability to operate in the environment.
Of course Jimmy could have been Nixon and pulled off an ingenious raid to liberate an EMPTY prisoner camp near Hanoi….
Can we agree?
Poor plan
Poor equipment
Poor training
Poor execution
All of which led to one of the most embarrassing military operations in U.S. history.
Poor plan
Poor equipment
Poor training
Poor execution
All of which led to one of the most embarrassing military operations in U.S. history.
Things went wrong which no one had an idea we needed to train for. I will say that the Military did need to grow and evolve at that time and it took a failed mission to teach them that lesson.
What exactly were those things which no one had an idea we needed to train.
I think people, conservatives especially, place way too much importance on it. In terms of impact, death toll, etc…. It was a nodal point for our military to grow.
I’ve seen some people place it above things like the Little Bighorn, the 1812 invasion of Canada, Market Garden, etc…. Which is fundamentally ludicrous.
I would argue the failed rescue attempt had a much greater impact on the psyche of the American public than any of those events for a variety of reasons. At a time when America was struggling at home and abroad the perception was disastrous. I remember all too well.
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Hahahahahaha Do you know what day the news of Custer’s last stand reached Grant in Washington?
July 4th 1876. The 100 year anniversary of the country. You think that wasnt a blow to the American psyche? LMAO
The only reason people remember a failed hostage rescue from 40 years ago is because they didn’t like Carter.
Aston arguing himself into a corner, and refusing to quit. 'Good times never felt so good', Sail On.
If you have a D after your name you better believe Aston is going to die on that hill defending you. Regardless of how bad the operation was botched. The power of partisanship is great. Some things never change.
Aston….how long do you think it took for the American people to hear the details of Custer? How many never heard them at the time? Like I said….the failed rescue had a greater effect on the American public psyche for a variety of reason. Immediate access of information being one of the most important.
Still would like to know which things happened we had no idea we needed to train for?
Aston….how long do you think it took for the American people to hear the details of Custer? How many never heard them at the time? Like I said….the failed rescue had a greater effect on the American public psyche for a variety of reason. Immediate access of information being one of the most important.
Still would like to know which things happened we had no idea we needed to train for?
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The news of Custer hit all the major population centers in the US the same day that Grant found out (Independence Day) because of the telegraph…. Though admittedly some papers weren't able to print about it until the following day or two.
Heck, Pearl Harbor had a much much much greater impact was a much worse military failure lol.
How many people care about the navy seals that drowned in Grenada? How about the special forces failure in Mogadishu? (18 killed and 84 wounded)
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Correct. I was referring to all of those not living in the major population centers.
Now back to those things we had no idea we needed to train for
Did we know that we needed to train for low altitude navigation through sandstorms? You tell me….Correct. I was referring to all of those not living in the major population centers.
Now back to those things we had no idea we needed to train for
I mean, a thoughtful person might have suggested it at the time given the environment, but we didn’t know it would ultimately jeopardize the lives of 8 men because of the series of events that it caused (In terms of the choppers getting to the site late which had a ripple effect)
Considering the mission was for low altitude flight across the desert during the month where unpredictable sand storms are most prevalent one would certainly believe we should have been prepared and trained for that scenario. As I said above, the largest marine base in the US is located in a desert. If we hadn’t trained for missions in that type of environment and included alternative options then that’s on us. Especially considering the time of year of the mission. Poor planning and poor execution.
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Not trying to defend the point, but the Maranjab desert is probably more prone to sand storms than the Mojave. But I would think they were aware of that, and it's not like they were limited in time to train. They could wait for a rain storm to kick up some dust in their training schedule in the Mojave.
Agree. The point is you’re conducting an operation during the time of year where sandstorms are most prevalent. Hard to believe they hadn’t trained for similar circumstances or at least had a contingency plan should the weather worsen. It’s not like this was unforeseen.
What the operation really lacked was forethought. Not enough people asked “and what if _____ happens”.
What the military got better at after the exercise was contingency planning.
I haven’t found any evidence that they conducted any advanced desert flight training prior to the raid btw..,, as much as it seems obviously necessary in hindsight.
You think that career generals didn't ask enough what ifs....
You don't have much faith in our brass at the time. I don't think that was the main cause.
A lot of the career generals fought in Vietnam. They should have been well versed in asking enough what ifs.
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They were very much limited in their time to train. There were hostages that could have been executed at any moment. They were told to be ready to go in hours, not weeks or months. One of the biggest lessons learned by the US military is that we had inadequate hostage rescue capability and the training elements were decentralized and training command was disjointed. It took more than a month just to get the planes and helicopters together to train and when they did, they debriefed separately because they landed at different airfields in different states. The United States is very lucky they were not executed in retaliation for this failure. I will always wonder how much extra the ransom cost us.
We take it for granted that the US military can do hostage extraction anywhere in the world on little notice and has a literal army of guys trained up to do it. And we do now, several thousand in and out of service in various states of readiness. But back then, we simply didn't. Guys went on this mission, even though they were the newly created Delta, that had no hostage extraction training prior to this operation being planned. much less experience. Arguably only the British SAS could have been pulled this mission off at this time and they had been telling us for years to built out their capability.
If they execute the hostages we probably go to war. I wouldnt have expected them to have done that. All in all, their ransom was pretty mild compared to what they could have asked. (The dissolution of Israel, ending our alliance with Saudi, etc….)
They were absolutely aware of the weather. Combat Meterology is a trained specialty with its own MOS. MOS93. The Navy has its own meteorology command. Heck, even back in World War I, combat meteorology and hydrology was used to divert storm water run off in to opposing trenches. in World War II, the failures of combat meteorology, intelligence, and command structure led to numerous problems in the aforementioned Market Garden above. For instance, cloud cover over England delayed Polish forces from inserting and poor planning based on forecasted rain prevented their movement to other airfields. There is no doubt in my mind that historical trends in weather we studied for that area going back centuries. We are talking about soldiers lives. They study every contingency. The haboob was forecast and matrix was created showing historical haboob occurrences by month and location. It never made it to the pilots due to intelligence concerns over op sec. Critics who have studied this operation with a trained eye have suggested this was done to prevent the pilots from expressing a desire to define abort criteria in advance. Withholding this information left it to individual pilot and flight team discretion. The result was that one flight team was forced to land, another aborted, and those that arrived were more than an hour late -- while the others burned fuel waiting. An issue critical later.
The problem with this operation was that the weather was not adequately communicated by the meteorology experts to the operators on mission. At the tactical level the intelligence element, not the weather guys, was relating the limited information they grasped to the operators and they lacked the visibility to give them complete information, such as the matrix described above. In reality, it didn't matter.
Everybody knew about the sand storm. It wasn't like they flew out there into a surprise and didn't train for something like that. That's propaganda.
The sand storm did not damage the helicopter that turned around in the storm and aborted. They had an electrical problem traced back to poor maintenance. They were unable to fly on instruments and visibility was poor. The meteorology team was unable to communicate that if they continued another 30 minutes, they would be out of the storm and could land safely at the refueling point. For operational security reasons, the weather dudes were left out. The intelligence guys did not know or did not tell the pilots that if they continued on, they would be out of it. Nor did that aircraft know that a previous helicopter had already aborted. The pilots said in debriefing that if they knew they could have emerged and landed safely in as little as 30 minutes and they knew that the mission would be at a critical low of aircraft to continue, they would have continued on. This lack of communication comes down to disjointed combat control at the tactical command level.
The problem wasn't training in bad desert weather in case that happens. The problem wasn't knowing there was bad weather in advance. The problem was that the command structure, an extraordinary op-sec control, and primitive communications technology at the time prevented management of known risks and outcomes caused by weather.
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Considerable literature is available publicly with simple Google searches documenting the assault team's training at the Farm in Virginia and Fort Bragg grounds in NC with the helicopter insertion team training at the Yuma Proving Grounds in Arizona conducting two week long training shifts several times over the course of months as the mission parameters changed and the limitations of the aging Navy helicopters caused problems. Other ground elements trained in Europe and Washington DC area but without aircraft or helicopters for reasons never explained.
Numerous problems were identified with the torpedo helicopters contemplated for use because the Blackhawk was not yet on line and over due. Using Marine pilots in aircraft they had never flown conducting low level map of the Earth missions in low visibility conditions and night vision googles they had never used was problematic but that is what command ordered. Several team members expressed reservations about the equipment, including the helicopters that were constantly failing due to age and poor upkeep. Critics believe that Carter wanted the Navy at the forefront because he served in the Navy. Pragmatists point out that the post-vietnam era left us with no other options.
So you had guys who were used to flying well above the sea or jungle training to fly at low level over deserts. Training itself was disjointed with the helicopters, airplanes, and ground forces all training at separate locations. For security reasons, they never trained together, they never conducted a joint training exercises, or a final staged operation with independent command oversight/audit of the adequacy of the training or equipment. The paranoia that there would be a leak or that the Russians would tip off the Iranians with satellite imagery showing the units coming together was at an all time high.
The airplane crews trained at their bases in Guam and Florida due to operational needs and a desire to avoid surveillance. We couldn't spare the aircraft until the operation began, the military was that depleted. So depleted some of the C-130s instrument panels used had not been retrofitted for use with night vision googles and the pilots basically flew without instruments.
But to answer your question directly: yes the helicopter pilots and crews trained for months with advanced desert flight training, including sand storm conditions. The decision to use Marine pilots necessitated hours of additional training because Marine pilots hover land on boats and in a desert you need to no hover hard land to avoid the brown out that caused the crash. Something many of them had never done even once.
Incredibly, some of the ground element did not train at all and had no combat experience.
Training was also frustrated by the Carter Administration's knee jerk order to have all CIA operatives removed from the country to avoid more hostages or public execution. So they had no idea how many locations to go, how many to rescue, or how to get out. That made training parameters and equipment requirements to constantly change. In some cases, training started over from the beginning just weeks away from the mission going overseas. It was far from the sand tables and mock buildings with over watch training exercises you see in the movies.
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You need to read and listen more before you opine. Covert action is taken as a third option. Only in situations where the first option, Diplomacy has failed or is not feasible. The second option is conventional military response, i.e., extended combat operations by ground forces in a war declared by Congress. This was not an option. The Armed Forces did not have the capability to insert into Iran or the equipment for extended desert combat operations. It would have taken the balance of Carter's term to get ready for that. More over, 3 years from the end of VietNam, there was no public support for the Armed Forces in general and absolutely no support for another war. With the budget strained by high inflation and high taxes for the time straining Mom’s budgets, Carter couldn't pay for or justify a war.
The Iranians knew this. This is why they took the hostages. That is why we chose a third option to try and resolve it and failed. Carter cut off the payments to the mulahs and they took hostages to try to force the payments turned back on. They knew we weren't going to war and they wanted to embarrass us with failed diplomacy trading the hostages for the money. That is what made the mission failure so devastating to the public at the time. We failed in all three options. America was impotent. Iran could have killed them and we would not have done a thing about it. Except maybe do what we did anyway, provoke our friend Saddam Hussein to invade Iran.
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Tactical command ops not communicating and/or being communicated to properly is usually where the problems start on a mission like that.
They were doing what has been done many times before, and using training methods for their last war, and thinking it was going to translate.
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The equipment did not match the mission. They had to invent the training on short notice to match the mission using the equipment cards they had been dealt. Agree that the pilots lacked some core skills because they had initial training on equipment and combat conditions from previous wars/Cold War needs.
The command structure was totally disjointed. In the case of the training, multiple officers believed they had command authority. The most senior guy with knowledge of the Navy helicopters. The most senior of the Marine pilots. The most senior of the Army from the JTC. All three thought they were running the show in Yuma and that was just Yuma. Out of a movie, the Navy guy wanted everything in writing. The Marine guy only trained up guys ready to fly by the seat of their pants regardless of branch, and the Army guy spent most of his time flying back and forth to Washington saying everything was fine when they could have been activated with hours notice and guys literally didn't have helmets, night vision, or more than a couple of hours in the helicopter in some cases.
The biggest problem is the Washington element did not assign a single officer to coordinate amongst the three main training locations. No hand knew what the other was doing. Or not doing. Or what didn't work. Or what might cause problems for the other areas. And it caused serious problems.
Another big problem people dont mention much is the issue with the refueling. It really stretched our ability to insert the far north from the sea. They trained using fuel bladders that are essentially big rubber bombs filled with fuel. Initially the plan was only for the helicopters to land and recover the bladders, refuel, then move on. But they kept failing. Either the bladders burst or the helicopters were so junky and poorly trained they would always leave too late in simulations. So command in Washington ordered the fuel pump system for the C-130s. That was brand new technology. Never used before in combat. They had to invent how to pump fuel from these mattress like rubber fuel tanks out the back door of the aircraft. But the length of the hoses and the nature of the sand meant that they had to mount the pump on the back door ramp. Which meant the helicopters had to fly in close to connect the hoses up. And that's why the helicopter was so close and crashed into the airplane on a simple brownout take off with a minor stick adjustment in error.
That where the Desert One landing base was invented. They had to find and create an airstrip for the planes. So they couldn't modify the insertion around the storm, amongst other problems.
So a single dude, an Air Force Combat Controller, dropped alone into the desert to set up the landing field beacons and illuminate the guide path. That guy has the biggest balls of the 20th Century. Alone in Iran. Beheading certain if being alone in the middle of the desert didn't kill you first. No hope of rescue if the mission scrubbed. He parachuted in by himself to prep the pathfinding crew coming later. Nameless hero.
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I am not a student of military history. But I was a teenager at the time and this was a key point in political history. It was embarrassing. It sealed Carter's fate.
It's not clear to me Carter would have won the election. But I do wonder where we would be now if he did win. The era of tax cutting would have been delayed by at least four years, but on the other hand would middle eastern history have shifted in important ways with a successful rescue?
It's not clear to me Carter would have won the election. But I do wonder where we would be now if he did win. The era of tax cutting would have been delayed by at least four years, but on the other hand would middle eastern history have shifted in important ways with a successful rescue?
I’d argue the converse. If they had killed the hostages, and we invaded, (which is pure fantasy if you lived in that era as we both did), then that may have displaced the theocracy, maybe, doubtful, but maybe, and we would not have a nuclear powered Iran threatening the region now. I think that would have destabilized other areas, or dispersed the problem, but we will never know. I’m not a student of military history either. But as you have seen, I don’t post over here unless it’s a topic I know quite a bit about. Usually from personal experience. In this case, I spent a good portion of the 80’s reading everything I could get my hands on about this subject, including many hours in McFarlin. And then again when YouTube took off and you could listen to the dudes tell you what wasn’t in the after action reports and War College thesis papers.
I don’t think Middle Eastern history would have changed much. The Nixon strategy of triangulating with the Israelis and their contiguous neighbors to reinforce regional stability would have continued. The Saudis and the Egyptians would have been quite pleased we dispatched their Shia rivals, even if it they said different on TV and in the cafes of Paris. King Hussein would have been relieved. A lot fewer Iraqis would have died. Their losses in that war were horrendous and barely covered at all by the Western press at the time. Perhaps by design.
A good deal of what you have talked about aligns with convention and military reports on the subject, but as I’ve fact checked you a number of things don’t quite match the current understanding or analysis of what went down. What it reminds me of is someone regurgitating information made available at McFarlin in the 80’s lol.
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